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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this research is to examine CEO salary and to explore whether the independent 
variables (international diversification, industrial diversification, market-based performance, 
accounting-based performance) are associated with CEO salary. Corporate diversification in this 
study is divided into international diversification and industrial diversification.  Data for the study 
was obtained from annual reports of CEO salary on the ExecuComp database.  Compensation 
data collected from the annual reports encompassed 2,448 CEOs from 1,622 firms. The dependent 
variable was developed from a review of CEO salary and accounting literature. The hypothesized 
predictors of CEO salary were identified through a review of existing studies. The results show 
that the higher the degree of international diversification and/or industrial diversification, the 
more CEOs receive in fixed salary. In addition, this study found that CEO salary is a better 
predictor of accounting performance than stock return performance. 
 
Keywords:  CEO Compensation; Chief Executive Officer Salary; Corporate Diversification; International 
Diversification; Industrial Diversification; Firm Performance 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
uring the past decade, CEO compensation has drawn considerable public scrutiny (Cyert, Kang, & 
Kumar, 2002) with many researchers examining the relationship between CEO compensation and 
corporate governance mechanisms (Cyert, Kang & Kumar, 2002; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).  
Moreover, a growing number of researchers have found a link between incentive compensation and performance 
(Kaplan, 1994; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Research has shown that CEOs of growth firms receive a larger portion of 
their compensation from long-term incentive compensation, while those of non-growth firms receive a larger portion 
of their pay from fixed salary. However, few researchers have analyzed CEO salary. Thus, in order to find the 
factors that impact on CEO salary, this study uses International Diversification, Industrial Diversification, Market 
Based Measures of Performance, Accounting Based Measures of Performance, Investment Opportunities, Firm Size, 
and Stock ownership as the determinants of Chief Executive Officer Salary. Control variables for the study are 
Tenure, Age, Duality, and Gender. 
 
Definition of Terms 
 
Executive Compensation  
 
 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires listed firms to report certain information on 
the compensation of their five most highly paid executives, which typically includes among others, the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO).  Numerous researchers have developed their own definitions of executive compensation 
based on their sample data. Gaver and Gaver (1995), for example, state that total compensation equals base salary 
plus annual bonus plus long-term compensation. Duru and Reeb (2002), on the other hand, considered total 
D 
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compensation to be the sum of short-term compensation and long-term compensation.  Short-term compensation 
included salary and cash bonus.  Long-term compensation included stock options, restricted stocks and 
miscellaneous other long-term compensation. Standard and Poors Research Insight (2004) state that total 
compensation is comprised of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value of restricted stocks granted, total 
value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes method), long-term incentive payouts, and all other total 
compensation. 
 
Corporate Diversification  
 
 Corporate diversification consists of both international diversification and industrial diversification (Duru 
& Reeb, 2002; Kim, Kim, & Pantzalis, 2001). 
 
International diversification 
 
 International diversification is defined as a firm's expansion beyond the borders of its domestic country 
across different countries and geographical regions (Capar & Kotabe, 2003). 
 
Industrial Diversification 
 
 Industrial diversification is the expansion of a company into different lines of business or industry segments 
(Kim, Kim, & Pantzalis, 2001). 
 
Definitions in this study 
 
 For purposes of this study, the following definitions apply: 
 
Table 1 
Term Definition 
Total Compensation Short-term compensation plus long-term compensation plus all other compensation 
Short-term Compensation Current compensation and other annual compensation 
Current Compensation Annual salary and bonus 
Salary Dollar value of the base salary (cash and non-cash) earned by the named executive officer 
during the fiscal year 
Bonus Dollar value of any bonuses (cash and non-cash) earned by the named executive officer 
during the fiscal year 
Other Annual Compensation Dollar value of other annual compensation not properly categorized as salary or bonus 
Long Term Compensation Incentive compensation plans and all other compensation 
Incentive compensation plans Stock options, restricted stocks and long-term incentive plans 
Stock Options The aggregate value of all options granted to the executive during the year as valued by 
the company 
Restricted Stock Value of all options granted during the year (determined as of the grant date) 
Long term Incentive Plans Amount paid to the executive under the company’s long-term incentive plan 
All Other Compensation Compensation not belonging under types of compensation 
Sources: Extracted from Duru and Reeb (2002); Gaver and Gaver (2003); Sanders and Carpenter (1998) and Standard and Poors 
Research Insight (2004).  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
International Diversification and CEO salary 
 
International operations are more profitable than comparable domestic operations (Fatemi, 1984). When 
corporations diversify internationally, operations result in a more complex managerial decision-making environment 
(Duru & Reeb, 2002). International diversification also requires enhanced information processing and requires 
specialized knowledge of competitor operations as well as the firm’s own operations across boundaries (Sanders & 
Carpenter, 1998). The increased complexity of international operations increase the shareholders and board of 
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directors difficulty of monitoring the CEO, thereby better aligning CEO interests with stockholder interests and thus 
increasing CEO salary. In order to reduce the shareholders and board of directors’ difficulty of monitoring the CEO, 
a variety of motivation strategies based on expectancy theory were used to increase performance in decision-making 
that were consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. A measurement was made to determine if the 
performance improved and the expected compensation reward was produced. Thus, this study predicts that 
international diversification is positively associated with CEO salary. Therefore:  
 
Hypothesis 1H :  International diversification is positively associated with CEO salary.   
 
Industrial Diversification and CEO salary 
 
 Corporate diversification into different industries creates a portfolio of operational units (Kim, Kim & 
Pantzalis, 2001). Industrial diversification potentially benefits corporate managers through increased power and 
salary (Denis, Densi & Yost, 2002). Based on expectancy theory, an increase in the CEO salary will motivate 
managers to work harder on these more complex operational units to increase performance and to make decisions 
that are consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 2H :  Industrial diversification is positively associated with CEO salary.   
 
Firm Performance and CEO salary 
 
 Researchers (Duru & Reeb, 2002; Balkin, Markman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000) have indicated that companies 
in different industries are likely to have different measures of company performance.  Two types of company 
performance measures are the accounting based measure of performance and the market based measure of 
performance.  Sanders and Carpenter (1998) point out those firms with high levels of performance may be able to 
pay more compensation than those that are performing less well. Consistent with prior research, the accounting- 
based measure of performance for this study is defined as annual earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) whereas 
the market-based measure of performance is defined as the common stock return at the end of the fiscal year. 
Expectancy theory implies that higher CEO salary will have a higher motivational effect on the CEO, and this higher 
motivation will result in higher firm performance thus maximizing shareholder wealth. 
 
Market Based Measures of Performance 
 
 Market-based measures of performance often center on some measure of the price of a single share of a 
company’s outstanding stock and stock return. Accordingly, stock performance is usually measured by changes in 
stock prices or stock return. Therefore, firms in industries that experience rapid growth, or involve rapid product 
cycles, may benefit from aligning their executives’ CEO salary with market-based measures of performance 
(Grossman & Hoskisson, 1998).  
 
Accounting Based Measures of Performance 
 
 Accounting-based performance measures are incrementally useful over market-based measures in CEO 
compensation contracts (Duru & Reeb, 2002; Baber et al., 1996). In an accounting-based measure of company 
performance, researchers typically use profitability or some measure of stockholders’ equity (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 
1994).  Profitability is usually measured as earnings per share (EPS), return on assets (ROA) earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT) and/or return on equity (ROE). The measures of EBIT, ROE and ROA are easily determined, 
perceived to be objective, and widely understood by owners and managers alike (Grossman & Hoskisson, 1998).  
According to Pavlik, Scott and Tiessen (1993), accounting performance is more important than stock performance 
with respect to cash compensation.  Financial ratios are widely used in accounting-based measures in firm 
performance.  Some researchers have relied on an internal performance measure, such as profit (Deckop, 1988), or 
ROE (Redling, 1981), or change in shareholder return (Platt, 1987), or a combination of nine measures of 
performance, including sales, profit, ROE, and EPS (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987).  
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 Previous empirical evidence also suggests that accounting-based, performance measures are incrementally 
useful over market-based, measures in executive compensation contracts (Duru & Reeb, 2002; Baber, Janakiraman, 
& Kang, 1996). When accounting returns are less informative with respect to the executive’s actions, there is a 
greater reliance on market-based measures than on accounting-based measures (Bryan, Hwang, & Lilien, 2000).  
Executives have discretion in choosing among various accounting or reporting alternatives that can be used to 
manipulate accounting earnings. Because of the ability and incentive of executives to arbitrage differing accounting 
and tax regimes, international settings have a higher likelihood of earnings manipulation, than domestic settings 
(Duru & Reeb, 2002). Moreover, the potential for imperfect hedging on foreign exchange exposure suggests that 
accounting-based, performances measures are more useful than market-based performance measures when there is 
international diversification (Duru & Reeb, 2002). 
 
 Expectancy theory suggests that high salary compensation can be an effective strategy to motivate CEOs 
performance in a manner that is consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. Therefore,  
 
Hypothesis 3H :  Market-based performance is positively associated with CEO salary.  
 
Hypothesis 4H :  Accounting-based performance is positively associated with CEO salary.  
 
Accounting-based performance measures, Market-based performance measures and CEO salary 
 
 Pavlik, Scott, and Tiessen (1993) found that accounting performance is more important than stock 
performance with respect to cash compensation. This was especially true if the compensation consisted of some 
level of stock options. Singh and Agarwal (2002) found that short-term compensation is better predicted by 
accounting-based performance measures than by market-based performance measures.  In addition, Gaver and 
Gaver (1995) found that CEOs of growth firms receive a larger portion of their compensation from long-term 
incentive compensation whereas, those of non-growth firms receive a larger portion of their pay from fixed salary.  
Moreover, prior studies have shown that accounting earnings play a significant role in measuring performance for 
the purpose of compensation (Jensen & Murphy, 1990).  Thus, this study argues that CEO salary is predicted by 
accounting-based performance measures than by market-based performance measures. Therefore: 
  
Hypothesis 5H :  CEO salary is better predicted by accounting-based performance measures than by market-based 
performance measures. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Measurement 
 
The Compensation Model 
 
 A regression model was developed to test the hypotheses.  The compensation function discussed in the next 
section is modeled as:  
 
CEO compensation structure i  = f (INTD, INDD, RET, ACE, IO, SIZE, OWN, Tenure, Age, Duality, Gender) 
Where   CEO compensation structure = CEO salary  
INTD= International Diversification 
INDD= Industrial Diversification 
RET= Market-based measure of performance 
ACE= Accounting-based measure of performance 
IO= Investment Opportunities 
SIZE= Firm Size 
OWN= Stock Ownership 
Tenure= CEO position tenure 
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Age=CEO age 
Duality=CEO duality 
Gender=CEO gender 
 
Dependent variables 
 
 The dependent variable in this model is CEO salary.  CEO salaries were obtained from the ExecuComp 
database.  
 
 CEO salary = SALARY 
 
Salary is the dollar value of the base salary (cash and non-cash) earned by the named executive officer 
during the fiscal year. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
 The independent variables are listed below. Data for the independent variables were obtained from 
COMPUSTAT’s Geographic Segment File, COMPUSTAT’s Industry Segment File, COMPUSTAT’s database, and 
the CRSP database. 
 
International Diversification (INTD)  
 
 Firms are classified as multinational if they report any foreign sales on COMPUSTAT’s Geographic 
Segment File. Otherwise, they are classified as domestic firms. COMPUSTAT limits the number of global segments 
to five.  
 
Industrial Diversification (INDD)  
 
 Firms are classified as multi-segment on COMPUSTAT’s Industry Segment File if they report more than 
one business segment on COMPUSTAT’s Industry Segment File. Otherwise, they are classified as single-segment.  
COMPUSTAT limits the number of industrial segments to 10.  
 
Firm performance (FP)  
 
 Market-based performance (RET) is measured as the common stock return at the end of the fiscal year.  
Accounting-based performance (ACE) is measured as annual earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). Market-
based, measures of performance are often centered on some measure of the price of a single share of a company’s 
outstanding stock and stock return. Stock performance is usually measured by changes in stock prices or stock 
return.  The advantages of market-based measures of performance are that they are easily determined, objective, and 
widely understood by both owners and managers (Grossman & Hoskisson, 1998).  Compared to market-based 
measures of performance, accounting-based performance measures are considered by some researchers to be 
incrementally useful for CEO salary contracts (Duru & Reeb, 2002; Baber et al., 1996) Accounting-based, measures 
of company performance usually rely on profitability or stockholders equity (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1994). 
Profitability is usually measured as EPS, ROA, or EBIT. Return on assets (ROA) is used to measure the 
performance of each individual year within the sample in this study.  
 
Control Variables 
 
 The control variables for this study are Investment Opportunities, Firm Size, Stock Ownership, CEO 
position tenure, age, duality, and gender.  
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Investment Opportunity (IO) 
 
 Investment opportunity (IO) is defined as research and development expenditures divided by the market 
value of the firm. The literature contains several measures for the firm's IOs (Collins, Blackwell & Sinkey, 1995). 
The investment opportunity set is unobservable and determining is likely to be imperfectly measured by any 
individual measure. The most frequently used measures of investment opportunity are market-to-book ratios, such as 
the ratio of the market value of the firm to the book value of its assets (Duru & Reeb, 2002; Gaver & Gaver, 1993).  
A factor analysis was conducted to form a composite measure of the investment opportunity set using prior 
investment intensity, growth in the market value of assets, market-to-book ratio, and research and development 
expenditures (R&D).  Another popular measure of investment opportunity is the ratio of the market value of equity 
to the book value of equity (Chung & Charoenwong, 1991). The level of R&D intensity is also another measure of 
the investment opportunity set (Kole, 1994; Skinner, 1993). Revenue or return variability have also been used as 
measures of investment opportunity (Christie, 1995; Smith & Watts, 1992). Growth firms can be expected to have 
high market-to-book asset and equity ratios, levels of research intensity, and variability measures. 
 
 Lambert and Larcker (1987) employed the growth rate in assets as a measure for the size of the investment 
opportunity set.  They argued that regulated firms have a smaller investment opportunity set than larger firms.  
Moreover, Smith and Watts (1984) utilized a binary variable to determine whether a firm operates in a regulated 
industry. In addition, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) used the growth rate in sales to measure the investment opportunity 
set for firms going private. Collins, Blackwell and Sinkey (1995) employed three different measures of investment 
opportunity set. They used the ratio of the market value of common equity to the book value of common equity 
(MKT/BOOK). The market value of equity reflects the investors' ownership in the market value of assets-in-place 
plus the market value of growth options while the book value of equity reflects the investors' ownership in the 
existing assets of the firm. The MKT/BOOK ratio, therefore, should be higher for firms with greater growth 
opportunities. To measure investment opportunities, this study uses research and development expenditures divided 
by the market value of the firm (Gaver & Gaver 1993; Baber, Janakiraman & Kang, 1996). 
 
Firm Size (SIZE) 
 
 Firm size in this study is measured as total assets. Sales volume (Newman & Banister, 1998) and total 
assets (Sridharan, 1996; Useng, 2000) are two generally used measured of firm size. Firm size is positively 
associated with the level of executive compensation (Sanders, Carpenter, 1998; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; 
Gaver & Gaver, 1995; Geomez-Mejia, 1994). Higher levels of compensation are expected to be paid to executives in 
larger firms (Gaver & Gaver, 1995) because the larger the scope of operations, the greater the demands on top 
executives.  Useng, Wells, and Lilly (2000) examined the determinants of CEO pay for small and large firms and 
determined that firm size is a primary factor in determining CEO pay within small firms. This study uses firm size 
(SIZE) as a moderator variable. It is also used as an independent variable in the study’s models. 
 
Stock Ownership (OWN) 
 
 CEO stock ownership (OWN) is strongly related to compensation (Cyert, Kang & Kumar, 2002; Sanders & 
Carpenter, 1998). The level of a CEO’s stock ownership is associated with the proportion of pay he\she receives in 
long-term forms (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Sanders & Carpenter (1998) expressed CEO ownership as the percent 
of total outstanding shares. In addition, Sanders and Carpenter (1998) measured CEO stock ownership as the value 
of outstanding common shares owned by the CEO. As the measure for CEO stock ownership, this study uses the 
percentage of the company's shares owned by the named executive officer. Data were collected from Standard & 
Poor’s COMPUSTAT ExecuComp database. This study uses stock ownership (OWN) as a moderator variable. It is 
also used as an independent variable in the study’s models. 
 
Tenure  
 
 Tenure is measured as the number of years the executive has served as CEO. Studies have shown that the 
CEO’s position tenure affects CEO compensation (Cyert, Kang & Kumar, 2002). Executives with short tenures are 
generally likely to take more risks as decision makers and to depart from historical conventions than are long-
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tenured executives (Sanders, 2001). Longer tenure increases the CEO's power, enabling him\her to effectively 
increase their pay for performance (Hill & Phan, 1991). Sanders and Carpenter (1998) found that a CEO’s position 
tenure is positively associated with level of compensation. Young and Buchholtz (2002) found increased 
dissimilarity in tenure to be associated with a stronger pay-performance relationship. This study measures CEOs’ 
position tenure as the number of years that the CEO has held his or her current position. Data were collected from 
Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT ExecuComp database. 
 
Age 
 
 Age is measured as the age of the CEO at the end of the fiscal year. CEO age has been shown to be 
positively associated with base salary and equity compensation (Cyert, Kang & Kumar, 2002). CEO age affects 
his\her attitude towards employment. Mature CEOs are more conservative in their decision-making than younger 
CEOs (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), and Lewellen, Loderer and Martin (1987) argue that a CEO’s age is associated 
with a CEO’s compensation and firm performance. In addition, CEO age is strongly related to CEO strategic choices 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984), and Hitt and Barr (1989) found that CEO age is associated with compensation 
decisions. If a CEO is nearing retirement and is a principal owner he\she may pay himself\herself a lower salary to 
enhance future capital gains when they retire and transfer ownership (Cooley &Edwards, 1982). The CEO may also 
defer income into the future to prevent a higher tax rate. Data for age were collected from Standard & Poor’s 
COMPUSTAT ExecuComp database. 
 
Duality 
 
 Duality means that a CEO holds both the CEO position and chairperson of the board position. CEO duality 
is measured as a dummy variable with a CEO holding both positions being coded with a 1 and one not holding both 
positions being coded as a 0. 
 
The primary function of the chairperson is to organize board meetings and to take a lead in hiring, 
terminating, and compensating the CEO. A combined role of CEO and chairperson involves a potential conflict of 
interest in carrying out these separate roles and many feel it is important to separate the chairperson and CEO 
positions for the board to operate effectively. Thus, CEO duality has a negative relationship with effective board 
control. CEO compensation is expected to be higher in companies if duality exists, and it is expected that board 
control of the management decision function is lower in the presence of CEO duality. In addition, in complex 
environments where there is a high International diversification and industry diversification, duality is strongly 
related to CEO salary (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Moreover, Cyert, Kang and Kumar (2002) found CEO duality to 
be positively related to CEO compensation. Young and Buchholtz (2002) found that duality has a significant effect 
on the change in CEO pay, in that CEOs who are also board chairs receive higher pay. CEO duality is positive in the 
sense that it gives CEO’s the authority and responsibility to support effective decision-making (Finkelstein & 
D’Aveni, 1994), and they are able to respond more quickly to complex environments (Boyd, 1994). Therefore, 
compensation committees can reasonably expect more from dual-titled CEOs and can tie CEO salary more closely 
to performance.  Data for duality were collected from Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT ExecuComp database. 
 
Gender  
 
 Gender is measured as a dummy variable. If the CEO’s gender is male, a 1 is coded. If the CEO is female, a 
0 is coded. Popular press articles show that there is a gender component to CEO compensation and several authors 
have previously examined gender pay differences among the highly paid (Barbezat & Hughes, 1990; Gander, 1997; 
Ransom & Megdal, 1993). Few studies have addressed gender compensation paid (Bertrand & Hallo, 2000) and the 
results are inconclusive due to differing sample sizes (Bertrand & Hallo, 2000). Therefore, it is important to explore 
whether gender has a significant impact on compensation.   
 
Bertrand and Hallo (2000) analyzed gender differences among top executives in a large set of U.S. public 
corporations. They examined the gender compensation gap among high-level executives for the period 1992-1997 
by using Standard and Poor's ExecuComp data sample of more than 42,000 executive-year observations. The results  
indicated that, between 1992 and 1997, women nearly tripled their participation in the top executive ranks and 
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strongly improved their relative compensation. The gender gap in compensation among top executives was at least 
45% in 1997. Mohan and Ruggiero (2003) examined the compensation level for 47 female CEOs who held office 
during 2000 and compared their pay to a matched sample of firms headed by male CEOs. All components of their 
compensation were considered, including cash salary, bonus, long-term incentives, and the value of options granted 
for fiscal year 2000. The results supported the popular press articles that there is a gender component to CEO 
compensation. Williams (2003) found that men and women have consistent inequities in compensation. For the CEO 
position, he found that women earned an annual median total compensation of $98,000 compared to the $147,000 
earned by men. Data for gender were collected from Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT ExecuComp database.   
 
Sample Selection and Data Collection 
 
 The sample for this study was derived from secondary data selected from three databases, and 
supplemented with Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) data.  To be included in the sample, this study 
required that the company’s stock return data were available from the Center in Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
and that financial statement data be available from Standard and Poors ' Research Insight.  The ExecuComp database 
is based on the S&P400, S&P500, and S&P600 indexes that comprise mid-, large-, and small-cap firms, 
respectively.  This database reduces the time investment required to extract data from proxy statements, and 
alleviates the difficulty of extracting specific information from individual company reports.  However, there is often 
missing data, particularly relating to age and employment starting dates.  Thus, it was necessary to supplement 
information in the ExecuComp database with information contained in Lexis/Nexis. 
 
Table 2. Data Sources 
Variables Source of Data 
Dependent Variables  
CEO salary Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT ExecuComp database 
 
Independent Variables  
International Diversification(INTD) COMPUSTAT’s Geographic Segment File 
Industrial Diversification(INDD) COMPUSTAT’s Industry Segment File 
Market based Performance(RET) CRSP Database 
Accounting based Performance(EBIT) COMPUSTAT Database 
 
Control Variables 
Investment Opportunities 
Firm Size (SIZE) 
Stock Ownership (OWN) 
Tenure 
Age 
Duality 
Gender  
 
COMPUSTAT Database 
COMPUSTAT Database 
COMPUSTAT and ExecuComp Database 
Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT ExecuComp database 
Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT ExecuComp database 
Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT ExecuComp database 
Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT ExecuComp database 
 
CEO salary data were obtained from Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT ExecuComp (1997-2002). Most 
studies of CEO salary rely upon secondary data from filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
(Miller, 1995).  International diversification data were obtained from COMPUSTAT’s Geographic Segment File.  
Firms were classified as multinational, if firms report any foreign sales on COMPUSTAT’s Geographic Segment 
File; otherwise, they were classified as domestic firms.  COMPUSTAT limits the number of global segments to five.  
Industrial diversification data were obtained from COMPUSTAT’s Industry Segment File.  Firms were classified as 
multi-segment on COMPUSTAT’s Industry Segment File if they report more than one business segment on 
COMPUSTAT’s Industry Segment File; otherwise, they were classified as single-segment.  COMPUSTAT limits 
the number of industrial segments to 10.  In each year from 1997 to 2002, all firms that had data on both the Industry 
Segment and the Geographic Segment tapes were identified.  Market-based, data on firm performance for excess 
stock return data were from the CRSP database.  Finally, the financial characteristic data and accounting-based, data 
on firm performance were from the COMPUSTAT database.  These secondary data were considered to provide 
dependable and reliable data; thus, the data on the corporations for this study were obtained from these sources.  The 
source of data is summarized in Table 2. 
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 This study classified each firm’s primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code according to the 10-
K product breakdown (SIC), and classified each firm according to the industry classification scheme suggested by 
Lippert and Moore (1995) and further modified in this study.  A list of the 2448 CEOs, industry classes and the SIC 
codes in this study are provided in Table 4. 
 
 Murphy (1985) implemented a similar sample selection criterion in his study.  He used a time-series study 
of corporate performance and managerial compensation and included the top CEO only if the CEO was listed in the 
firm’s financial statement during the period 1964 to 1970 and remained with the same firm for at least five years.  
The sample selection for this study was conducted in a manner consistent with previous research on CEO 
compensation (Miller, 1995).  For this study, 1622 firms or 2448 CEOs during year 1997-2002 were identified. 
 
Statistical Analysis   
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 In this study CEO salary is the dependent variable and international diversification, industrial 
diversification, accounting-based performance, and market-based performance are the independent variables. These 
statistics allow researchers to see the distribution of each variable.  
 
Statistics Used to Show Relationships 
 
 Coefficient alpha, a type of internal consistency analysis, was conducted on the data to index the 
relationships among corporate differsification diversification, firm performance and CEO salary.  Correlation 
analysis, in conjunction with multiple regression analysis, was utilized to gauge the strength of the relationships 
between corporate diversification, firm performance and CEO salary.  Additionally, correlation coefficients (r) were 
used to measure the extent of the relationships between variables.   
 
 The correlation coefficient for examining the relationship between independent variables in this study is the 
Pearson Correlation coefficient.  Squaring the correlation coefficient results in the coefficient of multiple 
determination (
2R ), which was used in this study to measure the percentage of the variability in the dependent 
variable that can be explained by the independent variable.  Multiple regression analyses were employed to examine 
the relationship between corporate differsification diversification, firm performance and CEO salary. The purposes 
of these regression analyses are to answer the research questions in this study.  
 
 Regression analysis is the most widely utilized and versatile dependence technique applicable in the 
financial economics literature.  Zajac and Westphal (2004) have noted that several authors such as McWilliams and 
Siegel (1997) have also advocated the use of multiple regression analysis to control for possible third variables.  The 
Sample Data for this study covered six different periods, thus, autocorrelation could have occurred in the data 
(Binder, 1998).  The objective of multiple regression analysis is to use predictor variables with known values to 
predict a dependent variable.  Since the variables are weighted, their relative contribution to the prediction can be 
determined.  
 
 Multiple regressions were developed for the independent variable.  The first step required in multiple 
regression is to identify the relationships that exist between the dependent and independent variables and the 
relationships that exist between the independent variables.  This was done with correlation coefficients for every 
possible pair of variables in the analysis.  The correlation matrices determined whether multicollinearity was 
evident. Multicollinearity exists when the independent variables are too highly correlated among themselves (Hanke 
& Reitsch, 1994).  It was necessary to remove the variable with the least predictive explanatory power.  The other 
reason to eliminate multicollinearity is that each of the independent variables should explain a different part of the 
dependent variable.  The information output from these regressions was used to plot scatter diagrams for each 
variable to depict the relationship between variables.  
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Multiple Regression Model 
 
 Multiple regression models were established to identify the determinants of CEO salary.  CEO salary was 
selected as the dependent variable (Y) to be predicted by the independent variables, control variables.  
 
The first series of regression analyses tested the relationship between corporate diversification and CEO 
salary. These regression equations are as follows: 
 
 
 
Where, 0b = the constant of regression equation model 1 
1110987654321 ,,,,,,,,,, bbbbbbbbbbb =coefficient of  
GenderDualityAgeTenureOWNSIZEIOACERETINDDINTD ,,,,,,,,,,  
SALARY  denotes CEO salary for firm i  at time period t ; it is a dependent variable in equation 1. 
INTD  denotes international diversification.  
INDD  denotes industrial diversification. 
ACE denotes accounting-based performance and is measured by annual earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). 
RET  denotes market-based performance and is measured by the common stock return at the end of the fiscal year.  
IO  denotes investment opportunities and is measured by R & D expenditures scaled by the market value of the 
firm. 
SIZE  denotes firm size and is measured by total assets. 
OWN  denotes stock ownership and is measured by the percentage of the company’s shares owned by the named 
CEO officer. 
Tenure denotes CEO’s tenure and is the number of years that the CEO had held his/her current position at the end of 
the fiscal year.   
Age denotes CEO’s age and is the age of the CEO at the end of the fiscal year 
Duality denotes CEO’s duality and refers to the situation in which a CEO holds both the CEO and chairperson of the 
board positions.  
Gender denotes CEO’s gender and is the proxy gender of CEO, dummy variables, 1= male; 0= female  
it ,  is the error term (all measured for firm i  at time period t ). 
 
ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDING 
 
The Sampling 
 
 The initial sample consists of 2,598 CEOs reported by the ExecuComp database for the six-year period 
from 1997-2002.  From this initial sample, firms were excluded if they did not meet the following criteria: (1) 
Compensation data must be available on ExecuComp database, (2) Data must be available on Compustat’s 
Geographic and Industry Segment File, (3) Financial data must be available on COMPUSTAT (Standard & Poor’s 
Research Insight), (4) Stock return data must be available in the files of the Center for Research on Security Prices 
(CRSP) database.  Data on CEOs in this study consisted of the average of each variable for the CEOs.  
 
The final sample in this study included 2448 CEOs in 1622 firms.  Table 3 summarizes the number of firms 
that were excluded from the three databases. A breakdown of the 2448 CEOs by industry class and SIC code is 
provided in Table 4.  
 
 
 
it
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Table 3 
Reasons for elimination of CEO compensation firms from the initial sample 
Initial CEO sample 2598 
    Data unavailable on ExecuComp database 290 
Data unavailable on Compustat’s Geographic and Industry Segment File 653 
Data unavailable on COMPUSTAT database 4 
Data unavailable on CRSP database 39 
Final Sample 1622 
Note.  Data are comprised of 1,622 firms of observations from 1997-2002. 
 
Table 4 
Frequency statistics for CEOs (N=2448) 
 
 
 
SIC codes 
Number of 
observations 
 
% 
Panel A: Filing Year    
1997  335 14 
1998  414 17 
1999  828 33 
2000  438 18 
2001  433 15 
2002  71 3 
Total   2448 100.0 
Panel B: Type of Industry (SIC)    
0 = aerospace and shipbuilding 3720-3829 96 3.9 
1= agriculture and metal 0000-1099, 1400-1499 34 1.4 
2= cars 3711-3716 42 1.7 
3= chemical, tire, and leather 2800-2821, 3011-3199 73 3.0 
4= commodity 4812-4899 47 1.9 
5= computer and software 3570-3579, 7370-7389 299 12.2 
6= construction, wood, furniture and house 1500-1799, 2400-2599, 2840-2844, 3200-3299 86 3.5 
7= electric 3661-3699 161 6.6 
8= entertainment 7000-7369, 7400-7999 93 3.8 
9= finance 6000-6799 190 7.8 
10= food and tobacco 2000-2199 69 2.8 
11= health, education and law 8000-9999 93 3.8 
12= machinery 3510-3569, 3580-3652 138 5.6 
13= medical, photo and other 3841-3999 81 3.3 
14= paper and publish 2600-2673, 2711-2780 81 3.3 
15= petroleum and refinery 1220-1389, 2911-2999 87 3.6 
16= retail and wholesale 5000-5999 306 12.5 
17= steel 3300-3496 102 4.2 
18= textile 2200-2399 34 1.4 
19= transportation 4011-4799 61 2.5 
20= utility 4911-4991 160 6.5 
21=others 2833-2836,2851-2891 115 4.7 
Total CEOs   2448 100.0 
Note. Data are comprised of 2,448 CEOs observations with the mean for each CEO over the six-year period from 1997-2002. 
This study extracts each firm’s primary SIC code according to a 10-K product breakdown (SIC).  Each firm is classified 
according to the industry classification scheme suggested by Lippert and Moore (1995) and modified for this study.  
 
Analysis of Regression Effects 
 
 To test hypotheses 1 through 8, a hierarchical regression was employed.  The first step was to enter the 
control variables (tenure, age, duality and gender) into the equations.  The second step was to enter the various 
independent variables of international diversification, industrial diversification, investment opportunities, and firm 
size, firm performance, and stock ownership.  The significance of the change in 
2R  from steps 1 to 2 provides a test 
of whether the set of predictor variables in step 2 explain a significant amount of the variance in CEO salary beyond 
that already explained by the control variables.  
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Regression Model 1: CEO Salary 
 
 Table 5 reports the results of the hierarchical regression CEO salary full model, which examined 
hypotheses 1H , 2H , 3H , 4H , 5H . Table 6 reports the results of the estimated model, which included control 
variables plus the main effects of independent variables used to examine hypotheses 1H , 2H , 3H , 4H , 5H . 
 
Hypothesis 1H :  International diversification is positively associated with CEO salary. 
Hypothesis 2H :  Industrial diversification is positively associated with CEO salary.   
Hypothesis 3H :  Market-based performance is positively associated with CEO salary.  
Hypothesis 4H :  Accounting-based performance is positively associated with CEO salary.  
Hypothesis 5H : CEO salary is better predicted by accounting-based performance measures than by market-based 
performance measures. 
 
 To test the relationship between the seven independent variables as a whole and CEO salary, a hierarchical 
regression model was created by entering the control variables in step 1 and the five independent variables in step 2 
as discussed above. These are shown in Table 5 and results of the regression are shown in Table 6.  Standardized 
regression weights (beta) are reported for ease in comparing the strength of the relationship between CEO salary and 
the various predictor variables in the regression model. In total, as indicated by the significant overall F score 
(212.387, p<.001), the total set of predictor variables was significantly related to CEO salary.  In addition, the 
regression explained 49.0 % (adjusted 
2R = .488) of the CEO salary.  
 
 For hypothesis
1H : International diversification is positively associated with CEO salary.  The results of 
international diversification (  =.042, t = 2.713, p<.01) show that there is a positive significant relationship 
between international diversification and CEO salary. Thus, the results support hypothesis 
1H  that international 
diversification is related to CEO salary.  The results demonstrate that the higher the degree of international 
diversification, the higher the salary paid to CEOs. 
 
 For hypothesis
2H : Industrial diversification is positively associated with CEO salary.  The results of 
industrial diversification (  =.067, t = 4.127, p<.001) shows a positive significant relationship between industrial 
diversification and CEO salary.  Thus, the results support the hypothesis that Industrial diversification will be related 
to CEO salary.  The results demonstrate that the higher the degree of Industrial diversification, the higher the CEO 
salary paid to CEOs.   
 
 For the hypothesis
3H : Market-based performance is positively associated with CEO salary.  The market-
based performance analysis (  =.047, t = 3.254, p<.001) shows that market-based performance is positively and 
significantly associated with CEO salary.  Thus, the results support hypothesis 
3H  that industrial diversification is 
positively associated with CEO salary.  The results demonstrate that CEOs in higher market-based performance 
firms receive higher CEO salary than CEOs in lower market-based performance firms.  
 
 For the hypothesis
4H : Accounting-based performance is positively associated with CEO salary.  The 
results of accounting-based performance (  =.234, t = 10.189, p<.001) show that there is a positive significant 
relationship between accounting-based performance and CEO salary.  Thus, the results support hypothesis 
4H that 
accounting-based performance is positively associated with CEO salary.  The results demonstrate that CEOs in 
higher earnings firms, receive higher CEO salary than CEOs in lower earnings firms.  
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 Hypothesis 5H states that CEO salary is better predicted by accounting-based performance measures than 
by market-based performance measures. As the regression analysis in Table 6 shows, there is support for hypothesis
5H .  In the hierarchical regression analysis (Table 5), accounting-based performance is a significant predictor of 
CEO salary (.234, p<.001) and adds incrementally to the adjusted R-square.  Market-based performance is also a 
significant predictor of CEO salary (.047, p<.001).  In contrast to the coefficient of accounting-based performance, 
CEO salary is better predicted by accounting-based performance measures (  =.234) than by market-based 
performance measures (  =.047).  These results are consistent with Singh and Agarwal (2002) who found that 
accounting-based performance has a significant impact on short-term compensation.  These results also are 
consistent with Pavlik, Scott, and Tiessen (1993) who found that accounting performance is more important than 
stock performance with respect to cash compensation, while stock return appears to be more important when the 
compensation includes shareholding and options. Taken together, these results provide support for hypotheses 1H ,
2H 3H , 4H , 5H .   
 
ANALYSES AND RESULT 
 
 This study examines the influence of international diversification, industrial diversification and firm 
performance on CEO salary. Table 6 above presents the regression results for model 1 analysis for CEO salary.  
 
Effect of CEO salary 
 
International diversification (Hypothesis 1) 
 
 The results support hypothesis 
1H  that international diversification is positively associated with CEO 
salary.  The results demonstrate that the higher the degree of international diversification, the higher the CEO salary 
paid to CEOs.  Duru and Reeb (2002) found that there is a positive relationship between international diversification 
and total compensation and incentive compensation. This study extends their research to explore whether 
international diversification is positively associated with CEO salary.  This study supports their findings and 
provides additional evidence that international diversification is positively associated with CEO salary. 
 
Industrial diversification (Hypothesis 2) 
 
 The results show that there is a positive significant relationship between industrial diversification and CEO 
salary.  Since hypothesis
2H predicted that the sign was opposite, thus, no support was provided for hypothesis 2H .  
This result is inconsistent with Duru and Reeb’s (2002) finding that there is a negative relationship between 
industrial diversification and total compensation.  However, this study extends previous research in more detail to 
explore whether industrial diversification is associated with CEO salary. 
 
Market-based performance (Hypothesis 3) 
 
 The results support hypothesis
3H  that industrial diversification is positively associated with CEO salary.  
The results demonstrated that the higher the stock return earnings, the higher the CEO salary.  Singh and Agarwal, 
(2002) and Cyert, Kang and Kumar (2002) did not find a significant relationship between market-based performance 
and CEO salary. Unlike earlier studies, this study controlled for omitted variables, including stock ownership, 
investment opportunity, gender, age, duality, and tenure.  This improved methodology enabled this study to observe 
salary pay where previous studies found no relation between market-based performance and CEO salary.  
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Table 5 
Hierarchical Regression of CEO salary on Corporate Diversification and Firm Performance 
(Hypothesis bAH1 , bAH 2  , bAH 3 , bAH 4  , bAH 5 ) Model 1 
itit GenderbDualitybAgebTenurebOWNbSIZEbIObACEbRETbINDDbINTDbbSALARY ,11109876543210,   
  
CEO salary
a
 
Variables    t  2R  F  
Step 1:    .119 82.460*** 
 Control Variables     
 Tenure .135*** 8.779   
 Age .052**   3.485   
 Duality .090*** 5.725   
 Gender 
Investment Opportunities 
Firm Size  
Stock Ownership  
-.026† 
.001 
.403*** 
-.003  
-1.789 
.034 
17.233 
-.206 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 2: 
   .371 252.543*** 
 Predictor Variables     
 International Diversification .042** 2.713   
 Industrial Diversification .067*** 4.127   
 Market-based Performance .047*** 3.254   
 Accounting-based Performance .234*** 10.189 
Overall 
2R  and F    .490 212.387*** 
Adjusted 
2R    .488  
na  = 2439   b Beta weights and t -values reflect results for the full model and subsequent models  
† 001.**;*01.*;*05.;*10.  pppp  
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Table 6 
Results of Regression Equations Model 1 Analysis for CEO salary 
...(1)  
 
Variable    Model 1 
 
1b International Diversification( INTD )                                                                                  
 .042** 
(2.713) 
 
2b Industry Diversification ( INDD ) 
.067*** 
(4.127) 
 
3b Market based Performance( RET ) 
.047*** 
(3.254) 
 
4b Accounting based Performance( ACE ) 
.234*** 
(10.189) 
 
5b Investment Opportunities (
IO ) 
.001 
(.034) 
 
6b Firm Size (
SIZE ) 
.403*** 
(17.233) 
 
7b Stock Ownership ( OWN ) 
-.003 
(-.206) 
 
8b Tenure 
.135** 
(8.779) 
 
9b Age 
.052** 
(3.485) 
 
10b Duality 
.090*** 
(5.725) 
 
11
b Gender 
-.026† 
(-1.789) 
Adjusted 
2R  
.490 
Change in adjusted 
2R                                     
.371*** 
Note. na  = 2439  b Beta weights and t -values reflect results for the full model †
001.**;*01.*;*05.;*10.  pppp  
When the predicted sign is either (+) or (-), then the 
p
 value is a one-tailed test; when the predicted sign is (?), then the 
p
 
value is a two-tailed test.  
 
 
Accounting-based performance (Hypothesis 4 ) 
 
 The results support hypothesis
4H  that accounting-based performance is positively associated with CEO 
salary.  The results demonstrate that firms with higher earnings will pay higher CEO salaries. Singh and Agarwal 
(2002) found that there is no significant relationship between accounting-based performance and CEO 
compensation.  Cyert, Kang, Kumar (2002) found that there is a negative relationship between accounting-based 
performance and CEO compensation. However, the results are ambiguous.  This study found that accounting-based 
performance is strong positively related to CEO salary, which is inconsistent with previous research.   
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Market-based performance, Accounting-based performance and CEO salary(Hypothesis 5) 
 
 For Hypothesis 5: CEO salary will be better predicted by accounting-based performance measures than by 
market-based performance measures. The results are consistent with Singh and Agarwal (2002) who found that 
accounting-based performance has a greater impact on short-term compensation.  These results also are consistent 
with Pavlik, Scott, and Tiessen (1993) who found that accounting performance is more important than stock 
performance with respect to cash compensation, while stock return appears to be more important when the 
compensation includes shareholding and options.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Singh and Agarwal, (2002); Cyert, Kang and Kumar (2002) found no evidence that market-based 
performance is associated with CEO compensation. Unlike earlier studies, this study enhanced the methodology by 
controls for omitted variables such as stock ownership, investment opportunity and this enhanced methodology 
enables the study to observe salary where previous studies found no relation between market-based performance and 
CEO salary.  
 
 Duru and Reeb(2002) found a positive relationship between international diversification and total 
compensation and incentive compensation.  This study extends their study to examine in more depth whether 
international diversification is related to fixed CEO salary.  A review of the literature indicates that this is the first 
study to examine and confirm that there is a positive significant relationship between international diversification 
and CEO salary.   
 
 In conclusion, the study examined CEO salary for 2448 CEOs between 1997 and 2002.  Based on agency 
and expectancy theories, the study shows that the higher the degree of international diversification, industrial 
diversification, stock return performance, and accounting earnings performance, the more the CEO receives in fixed 
CEO salary. In addition, this study finds that CEO salary is better predicted by accounting performance than by 
stock return performance. 
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